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Abstract
Short Time Compensation [STC] was a key program in Germany to ﬁght the
crisis. However, STC is quite an old tool: in the past 100 years it has been used
quite often and is very multifunctional. It stabilized employment in every kind of
macroeconomic shock. After a brief look into the institutional and quantitative de-
velopment of STC and at a simple theoretical model, this paper tries to answer the
question whether STC prevents Schumpeterian creative destruction and structural
change in economic downturns. With the help of a VAR-Model we can analyze inter-
dependencies between the business cycle, STC and unemployment, ﬁnding evidence
for a bridging function of STC. A closer look at the pro-cyclical average stoppage
supports the thesis that most of the enterprises using STC are fundamentally eco-
nomically healthy, that is, STC does not prevent structural change in downturns.
Key words: Short Time Compensation, VAR, Paradox, structural change
JEL: E24, E32, C32, J38, N44
1 Introduction
The latest ﬁnancial and economic crisis was the hardest economic downturn in Germany’s
history. However Germany’s labor market is still robust. In 2009 unemployment rates
rose only slightly and were in 2010 already decreasing. Germany - formerly starving from
high and persistent unemployment - now shows a benchmark performance.
There is a broad consensus that this is also due to enterprises’ use of diﬀerent ﬂexi-
bility instruments, such as working-time accounts and Short Time Compensation [STC]
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(see i.g. German Council of Economic Experts [Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung - SVR] 2009, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development [OECD] 2010). The latter tool of internal numerical ﬂexibility experi-
enced a revival within the last two years and became one of the most important supports
for labor market stabilization (Brautzsch and Will 2010). The OECD (2010) now considers
STC programs as a useful institutional framework, especially in recessions. However, some
economists warn that due to STC measures a healthy Schumpeterian creative destruction
within recessions is prevented (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung [DIW] 2010:
26, Eichhorst et al. 2009: 37, Brenke et al. 2010: 12).
Looking at Germany’s increasing unit labor costs, the crisis did not pass by without
a trace. On the one hand, labor productivity declined (SVR 2009: 263, Herzog-Stein
and Seifert 2010: 11); on the other hand, STC does not lower labor costs linearly but
degressively (’Remanenzkosten’, see Bach and Spitznagel 2009a, 2009b). However, the
export’s development in 2010 shows that the temporary increase of Germany’s unit labor
costs did not harm its competitiveness.
Figure 1: Publications in Germany concerning STC
Source: Institute for Employment Research
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung -IAB),
own research
Having both a long history and being an important tool in the past, STC is surprisingly
not a frequent subject in economic literature, as can be seen in ﬁgure 1 (research from
November 2011). Only after German reuniﬁcation and the use of structural STC while
restructuring GDR’s economy, we can see a remarkable, if small, rise in publications. And
even in the actual crisis a macroeconom(etr)ic perspective is almost nonexistent. This
paper wants to help to close this gap by concentrating on the question of whether STC
harms the structural change in economic downturns by subsidization of non-competitive
enterprises, or has just a bridging function. The paper is structured as follows: Section
2 describes the institutional and quantitative development of Germany’s STC program.
After showing in a small theoretical model that temporary wage subsidies may stabilise2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN STC-PROGRAM 3
the economy in section 3, I include include STC in a vector-autoregressive model in section
4. With the help of this estimation it can be shown how Germany’s labor market reacts
to business cycle ﬂuctuations. In this framework there is evidence for a bridging function
of STC. Section 5 takes a closer look at the stoppage and its pro-cyclical development.
I conclude that the empirical facts contradict the thesis of hampering structural change.
Section 6 summarizes the main results.
2 Development of the German STC-program
STC has a long history in Germany. First agreements about a timely working-time
reduction were already made in 1881, in some cases connected to pecuniary compensation,
the so called ’waiting-payment’ (Holzmayer 1989: 6, 8). The Law on Tabac Tax (1909) and
the Potash-Law (1910) were the ﬁrst institutional steps toward compensation for workers
by the government (Holzmayer 1989: 9, Brenke et al. 2010: 2, Federal Employment
Agency [Bundesagentur für Arbeit - BA] 2009b: 1).1
In the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) unemployment and short time beneﬁts were al-
ready introduced in 1918. Between 1924 and 1926 STC has not been used. But in 1927, in-
troducing the ’Law of Labor Placement and Labor Administration’ [’Arbeitsvermittlungs-
und Arbeitsverwaltungsgesetz’ - AVAVG], the modern governmental employment agency
was founded and STC became a part of their policy tools (Flechsenhar 1979: 373, Kühl
1982: 252, BA 2009b: 1, Holzmayer 1989: 36). In the world economic crisis starting at
the end of the 1920s, STC played an important role in the Chancellor Brüning’s economic
policy (Schmuhl 2003: 187).
After WWII the institutional framework from 1939 was kept until 1956, when AVAVG
was amended (Holzmayer 1989: 57). This law was the foundation for the ’Law of Employ-
ment Promotion’ [’Arbeitsförderungsgesetz’ - AFG], which was introduced in 1969. The
AFG was not only the old AVAVG with a new name, but also policymakers’ answer to
the ﬁrst post-war recession in 1967. Its introduction was inﬂuenced by a more Keynesian
view of active macroeconomic employment politics (Kühl 1982: 254, Holzmayer 1989: 74,
Brenke et al. 2010: 4). In 1997, the ’Social Security Code III’ [’Sozialgesetzbuch III ’ -
SGB III] replaced AFG (Spitznagel and Bach 2000: 507).
The concrete institutional setting of the amount, duration and entrance barriers
changed with time, following the changing understanding of labor market regulation,
employment and discretionary ﬁscal policy. Table 1 shows the main steps.
The current regulation diﬀerentiates between three reasons for STC. First, if an en-
terprise is concerned by regular seasonal ﬂuctuations as, for example, in the constructing
1Both regulations target a structural dampening of policy measures introducing taxes, tariﬀs and
import quotas. STC as a tool within business cycle ﬂuctuations starts playing a role only later on.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN STC-PROGRAM 4




1918 Reich Act about Unemployment Welfare
1924 Reich Act about Unemployment Care
1927 Law of Labor Placement and Labor Administration (AVAVG)
1956 Amendment AVAVG: STC at 62.5 % (up to 80 % if family), maximum
duration 14 weeks, maximum 52 weeks in special situations at the
labor market, no payment of social insurance contribution.
1959 duration 26 weeks, maximum 52 weeks, introduction of bad weather
compensation
1969 Law of Employment Promotion (AFG), 50 % beneﬁts for health care*,
75 % beneﬁts for pension fund contribution*.
1975 Rise of STC up to 68 %, maximum duration 24 month in spezial
situations at the whole labor market.
1984 STC and Bad Weather Compensation up to 63 % of wages (68 % if children)
1983 Maximum duration 36 month for steel sector**, 50 % beneﬁts for
pension fund contribution*
1988 Introduction of structural STC
1990 Special AFG for GDR
1994 No payment of social insurance contribution (fully paid by ﬁrms),
lowering STC and Bad Weather Compensation to 60 % (67 % with children)
1995 Introduction of Winter Stoppage Compensation
1997 Extension of structural STC untill 2002
1998 Social Security Code III (SGB III)
2000 Extension of structural STC untill 2006
2004 Transfer STC replaces structural STC (Hartz III-reform)
2006 Seasonal STC replaces Winter Stoppage Compensation
2008 Maximum duration of STC: 18 montha
2009 [February] Lowering of 1/3-Regelation to 10 % concerned employees,
no minus working time accounts, 50 % payment of social insurance
contribution and 100 % if ﬁrms provide training, STC also for
temporary work agencies, [July] maximum duration 24 month, full payment
of social insurance contribution after seventh month STCa,
[November] maximum duration from January 2010: 18 monthsb
2010 [April] extension of social insurance contribution payment until April 2012b
Statutory basis: STC compensation: § 121 AVAVG, § 68 AFG, § 178 SGB III; duration: § 119 AVAVG,
§ 67 AFG, § 177 SGB III.
* following Gagel (2009). Bach and Spitznagel (2009a) deviate.
** following Gagel (2009). Bothfeld et al. (2009) deviate.
a part of ﬁscal impulse: Konjunkturprogramm I and Konjunkturprogramm II
b not part of ﬁscal stimulus package.
Sources: Holzmayer 1989, Bothfeld et al. 2009: 283, Niesel 1997: 480, Wissing et al. 2004: 1323,
Gagel 2009: 5, SVR 2009: 262, Crimmann and Wießner 2009: 9, BR 2009, BR 2010, BT 2010, Mares
1996: 21, Schmuhl 2003: 509: 557, Heinelt and Weck 1998: 71., Deeke 2009a: 4472 DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN STC-PROGRAM 5
sector, it can request seasonal STC between December and March (§§ 169, 175 SGB III).2
Second, if an enterprise restructures partly or fully, it can request transfer STC (§ 216b
SGB III).3 Third, a ﬁrm can demand cyclical STC (§ 169 SGB III4. This is quantitatively
the most important form of STC, since seasonal STC only made a minor contribution in
winter 2006/2007 and winter 2007/2008. Quantitatively, structural or transfer STC can
be ignored (see Deeke 2005: 176).
In downturns and spells of bad weather STC should prevent unemployment by helping
ﬁrms to keep workers. STC turns lay-oﬀs into a second best solution (Stellmach 2002:
77). This is certainly an important aspect for the German case, which has endured high
and persistent unemployment rates for decades. Implementing structural and transfer
STC programs, policymakers wanted to prevent stigmatization by unemployment while
ﬁrms restructured.
Firms may request (cyclical) STC (§ 169 SGB III) for economic reasons, if the man-
agement could not prevent this situation and about 1/3 of the workers are aﬀected by
more than a 10 % decline in wages (§ 170 SGB III). The STC is 60 % of the diﬀerence
between a worker’s wage in normal times and her actual income, and 67 % if the worker
is a parent. The maximum duration is six month (§ 177 Abs. 1 SGB III). In unusual
situations, for speciﬁc sectors, this can be extended up to 12 months, and if the whole
labor market is concerned, up to 24 month by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social
Aﬀairs (§ 182 SGB III).
In the latest crisis, the Federal Government reacted by lowering the STC barriers to
save employment. In November 2008 the maximal duration was extended to 18 months
from January 2009 on. With ’Konjunkturpaket II’, the second ﬁscal impulse to cush-
ion the downturn, there were several other changes: The Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit [BA]) pays 50 % of the social insurance contributions when
ﬁrms perform training during the STC-period, even up to 100 %. The number of aﬀected
workers declined from 1/3 to 10 %. Working time accounts do not need to have negative
amounts any longer. Temporary Work Agencies can request STC, too. From July 2009,
following the program ’Kurzarbeitergeld plus’, the maximum duration is extended up to
24 month; social contributions are generally paid from the 7th month, and even from the
1st month if another part of a bigger enterprise already participates in STC for more than
six months. Much of the regulation was limited until the end of 2010.5
In November 2009, the Federal Government [Bundesregierung - BR] announced that
2Before 2006 this was called Winter Stoppage Compensation (’Winterausfallgeld’ - formally § 214 SGB
III and §§ 74, 81 AFG) and before 1996 Bad Weather Compensation (’Schlechtwettergeld’ - formally §§
74, 83 AFG and § 143 AVAVG).
3In 2004 this replaced the structural STC (formally § 175 SGB III and § 63 Abs. 4 AFG). See Deeke
(2005: 179) for further information.
4formally § 63 AFG and § 117 AVAVG
5see for more details BA 2009a, Will and Brautzsch 2009: 201, Crimmann and Wießner 2009: 9,
Bogedan et al. 2009: 20, SVR 2009: 262, Deeke 2009a: 448, Brautzsch and Will 2010.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN STC-PROGRAM 6
the maximal duration from 2010 on will again be 18 months (BR 2009). In April the BR
announced that social contributions will be fully paid until April 2010 (BR 2010); the law
passed the German Parliament [Bundestag - BT] in July (BT 2010).
Beside the legal framework, collective labor agreements may contain higher compen-
sation amounts. In the chemical sector, STC is about 90 % of the normal wage, in the
metal branch up to 80 %, etc. (see for more information Bispinck 2009: I).
After this short look at the institutional historical development and the actual reg-
ulation, Figure 2 shows the STC’s quantitative behavior compared to unemployment.
Especially in economic downturns, as real GDP growth is near zero, STC played a re-
markable role. We can see this in the ﬁrst post-war recession in 1967; the recessions
following the burst of Bretton-Woods, the Deutschmark-Appreciation and the Oil-Crisis
in 1974/1975 and 1981/1982; in 1993 following reuniﬁcation; and in the actual ﬁnancial
and economic crisis in 2008/2009. However in 2001-2005 after the burst of the ’dot.com’-
/’New Economy’-bubble and 09/11 this is not the case. There may have been diﬀerent
reasons, such as the general deregulation of the labor market, the broader use of working
time accounts, rising marginal and ﬁxed-term employment, increasing residual costs be-
cause of less compensation for social security contribution, etc. for this little use of STC
(Bach and Spitznagel 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, Deeke (2005: 176) considers development
from 2001 as stagnatory, and not a surprising downturn causing the reduced use of STC
in this period.
Figure 2: GDP, STC and unemployment
Source: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀairs,
Federal Employment Agency, Bundesbank
Figure 2 shows an important point: The rise of STC in 1991 was for structural reasons
following the reuniﬁcation. This is no ﬂuctuation in the business cycle, as shown by the
increase of GDP at this time. The amount of workers in STC for business cycle reasons
is the highest since 1950. As the actual crisis was the deepest downturn since 1950, this
is reasonable, too.3 A SMALL MODEL 7
STC is an instrument for every kind of macroeconomic shock, as demand-shocks (1967,
1993, 2008/2009), supply side shocks (1974/1975, 1981/1982) and even structural shocks
(1991). STC could not prevent supply-side and reuniﬁcation induced hysteresis; but in the
demand-side induced shocks especially in 1967 and 2008/2009 it seems that STC fulﬁlled
its aim, and was very eﬀective. Some authors such as Völkel (1997: 144) consider the
cushioning eﬀect of STC on unemployment after the uniﬁcation as a favorable develop-
ment, even is unemployment could not be prevented in the medium- and long-run. STC
is also useful from a theoretical point of view. This will be shown in the next section.
3 A small model
From a macroeconomic and theoretical point of view temporary wage subsidies in general
and STC in particular may be quite useful. A simple model helps illustrating this point.
Assume that total output Y negatively depends on interest rates r.
Y = Y (r) (1)
Taylor-log-linearising around the steady state yields
^ y =  (^ r) (2)
with hats indicating deviations from (log) steady states,  =  Yr
1
 Y and subscripts deﬁning
partial derivatives.
Assume further that price development depends negatively on total unemployment U,
subsidies for labour cost L and positively on search costs S.
P = P(U;S;L) (3)
Log-linearising yields
^ p =  U^ u + S^ s   L^ l (4)
with U =  PU
 U
 P , S = PS
 S
 P, L =  PL
 L
 P.
Deriving the short run aggregate supply curve by using the fact that total output is
a product of labour force N and productivity such that ^ y =  ^ u + ^ n + ^  in logs and
deviations from steady state ﬁnally yields
^ p = U^ y   U(^ n + ^ ) + S^ s   L^ l (5)
Inserting a Taylor-rule of the following form
^ r = ^ p^ p + ^ y^ y (6)4 A SIMPLE VAR-APPROACH 8
gives the following expression for the output ﬂuctuation:
^ y =
1
1 + (^ y + ^ pU)
^ p(U(^ n + ^ )   S^ s + L^ l) (7)
The policy parameters ^ y, ^ p and U dampen total output ﬂuctuation caused by the right
side variables, since they turn the denominator to greater than one.
If public policy now subsidises wage costs counter cyclically - e.g. by implementing a
STC programme - according to the following rule
^ l =  ^ l^ y (8)
this even strengthens stabilisation since the output equation then takes the form
^ y =
1
1 + (^ y + ^ pU + ^ p^ lL)
^ p(U(^ n + ^ )   S^ s) (9)
Thus, from this simple theoretical framework I may conclude that there can be a stabilising
eﬀect of counter cyclical wage subsidies in general and of STC as a common instrument
in Germany. For a more sophisticated model see Will (2010). After these theoretical
considerations I now turn to empirical evidence.
4 A simple VAR-Approach
In this section I will for the ﬁrst time ever include STC in a macroeconometric framework
since there is a big gap in existing literature (a broad literature screening can be found
in Will 2010). From a pure theoretical consideration enterprises may adjust its labor
demand in cyclical downturns in diﬀerent ways. They may reduce the working volume
by lay-oﬀs and a constant per capita working-time or a per capita time reduction via
STC and other internal numerical ﬂexibility tools holding the stock of employed persons
constant. Wage adjustments seem to be diﬃcult since nominal wages normally are sticky.
However, there is a lot of extra payment as Christmas and holiday payments, revenue
premiums, provisions etc. that may be cut. In Germany in the last crisis enterprises used
a little bit of all.
STC can be evaluated with respect to its bridging function. Consider the following:
An enterprise gets into problems due to a macroeconomic slowdown. If the management
expects the crisis to be temporary and the ﬁrm is fundamentally competitive and health,
there is obviously no reason why not to keep employees, for example with the help of
STC. There may be other motives such as labor hording due to a lack of specialists etc.
that foster this decision. But what is about the end of STC-phase? Will employees get
unemployed if the crisis takes too long or if the ﬁrm suddenly decides to restructure?4 A SIMPLE VAR-APPROACH 9
These are quite essential questions. If most STC-workers after the crisis get unemployed,
STC is not as useful as it should be and policy-makers may consider abandoning the
program. However, if STC-workers stay employed after the crisis the program is certainly
quite successful in stabilizing the economy, since the stable employment security should
stabilize private consumption more than does automatic stabilizers as unemployment
beneﬁts.
To examine the STC’s cyclical performance, I will use a vector-autoregressive model
[VAR] approach. The latter can be used to analyze interdependencies of various (weakly)
stationary time series without any restriction. This may be criticized, especially the fact
that a VAR can be computed without a prior theory. However, the analysis is relatively
simple and avoids the construction of structural models. A broader and also critical
discussion of the chosen tools can be found in Favero ([2001] 2008: 133, 162), Kirchgässner
and Wolters (2006: 113), Gaab (2004: 140).
The analysis will concentrate on a key question: does STC in Germany fulﬁll a
bridging-function to stabilize employment or does it hinder Schumpeterian recession’s
structural change? I include the three series: a business cycle indicator, STC and unem-
ployment.
While having monthly data of the stock of STC and unemployment in Germany from
the early 1960s, I cannot use a proper German monthly business cycle indicator since it
does not exist on a monthly basis before 1991. Therefore I will use quarterly data starting
from 1970 up to 2011 (ﬁrst quarter) obtaining 165 observations per series.
Data can be found on the internet on the sites of the German statistical oﬃce and the
Federal Employment Agency as well as in printed publications of the Federal Employment
Agency. These are the series used: The ratio of workers getting STC to employed persons
[STCR], and of unemployed persons [UE] to employed persons [UER]. These numbers
diﬀer from the Federal Employment Agency’s numbers, taking employment data from the
federal statistics oﬃce. This is more convincing, since the Federal Employment Agency’s
deﬁnition changed in time and this analysis wants to include all employed persons not only
civil employees.6 Further the STCR should be adjusted by the uniﬁcation shock, since the
shock was not business cycle induced but a structural increase in times of prosperity with
a sociopolitical intention (Deekes 2009a: 447), like a parachute into unemployment (Völkel
1997: 146). Therefore the pure STC-data is adjusted such that between II 1990 and II
1992 the STC follows an artiﬁcial linear trend, rising about 45,000 people per quarter, so
that we get an adjusted series and an adjusted STC-ratio [STCR_AD]. Further data is
real GDP, which can be found at the German statistical oﬃce as well.
Including GDP, UER and STCR, this may lead to several problems. Every individual
series has diﬀerent properties. While GDP follows a deterministic trend, STCR is sta-
6Formerly, the Federal Employment Agency computed its unemployment rate only as a ratio to civil
employees. Therefore, this rate is larger than the rate as a ratio to all employees.4 A SIMPLE VAR-APPROACH 10
tionary but obviously truncated in its distribution that may lead to estimation problems
since the probability of outliers rises. The UER follows an almost stochastic trend7 and
- performing a Dickey-Fuller-Test - is not stationary but integrated of order 1. This is
problematic, since diﬀerencing following Okun’s Law (Okun 1962) would mean including
white noise stochastic shocks as explanatory variables. Including time trends - even if
they may vary in time - does not lead to satisfactory results. Detrending with the help
of the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter with a standard  = 1600 may be problematic - however
this leads to a stationary series and is used in this analysis - even if estimation with
non-detrended raw data would not result in roots of the characteristic polynomials out-
side of the unit circle and still fulﬁll VAR’s stability requirements. Therefore I include a
HP-ﬁltered UER-series [UER_DT] that may be interpreted as cyclical unemployment.
Simplifying I estimate the following model:
xt = A0d
struc + A1xt 1 + A2xt 2 + ::: + A5xt 5 + 
0d
temp + zt (10)
Where x is a vector containing the time series, A are coeﬃcient matrices and z is a vector
of non systematic, random disturbances. The structural dummy vector (dstruc) contains




following Favero ([2001] 2008: 73), I include a dummy catching outliers (dtemp). The ﬁve
lags follow the optimal lag length by the Schwarz-criterion (SC). Tests on residual charac-
teristics were performed using a Lagrange Multiplier for autocorrelation, the White-test
for heteroscedasticity and Jarque-Berra for normal distribution. Series’ order - GDP_AG
! STCR_AD ! UER_DT - for the impulse-response-functions follows a test on Granger
causality (see Kirchgässner and Wolters 2006: 122) as well as theoretical reasoning: Firms
are confronted with a macroeconomic shock, adjust working-volume via STC and then
lay-oﬀ if STC does not fulﬁll the bridging-function. If this is the case, there should be a
signiﬁcant rise of unemployment in the impulse-response-analysis following a STC shock.






S d_struc) with d_struc = 1 in the stagnation period at the beginning of
this millennium (I 02-II 03). For the huge outliers in times of recession I further include
dummies in IV 74 (ﬁrst oil crisis), IV 82 (second oil crisis), I 93 (reuniﬁcation-hangover-
recession), I 05 (Hartz IV8 and in I 09 (world ﬁnancial and economic crisis). GDP is
transformed in annual growths rates (..._AG).
Figure 3 plots the interesting impulse response functions of the estimated model. STC
is negatively connected to GDP. There is a signiﬁcantly counter-cyclical reaction for the
7Simply regressing UER on its lagged variable, its coeﬃcient is less but quite close to 1. This result
is quite reasonable considering the long-lasting persistence of unemployment in Germany.
8The so called Hartz-Reforms tried to change the German labor market structurally. Hartz IV ﬁrst of
all lead to an enormous rise in unemployed persons in 2005, which is a statistical eﬀect including people
getting social beneﬁt in unemployed statistics who were not included before.4 A SIMPLE VAR-APPROACH 11
Figure 3: Impulse-Responses GDP_AG, STCR_AD, UER_DT
ﬁrst 5 quarters (left box). Futher, there is a positive impact on GDP from STC, after
some periods even signiﬁcantly. This is quite reasonable since STC is only a transitory
situation for employed persons. At the end of a recession after about one and a half to
two years, they leave their status as STC recipient while GDP is growing again. Last but
not least the third box shows only slight reaction of unemployment to STC. Including
other variables that catch even more ﬂuctuations, this reaction would be even smaller.
If STC would not be bridging the slowdown, this reaction should greater. So this VAR
analysis at least slightly supports the assumption, that STC fulﬁls the bridging-function.
To control for robustness, there could be other series included, e.g. hours worked.
Since this series is highly correlated with GDP (both in growth rates) and because of
redundancies, these results are not presented here further. A general problem is the
double counting of time reduction: in aggregate data we ﬁnd the reduction of hours, but
STC includes reduction of hours, too. To distinguish between ﬂexibility instruments -
lay-oﬀs, STC and time reduction with the help of working time accounts - total hourly
volume should be adjusted by the real full time equivalent of workers receiving STC. Due
to the given data this is an impossible correction since there is not enough information
available.
Some general remarks should be mentioned concerning this framework. German aggre-
gate data suﬀer from huge structural disturbances, especially because of the reuniﬁcation.
Even with HP-ﬁltered unemployment rates and slightly adjusted STC stocks, estima-
tion problems arise due to a lack of STC-use in 2000-2005 (too low movement). On the
other hand, estimation suﬀers from high outliers in times of crisis. Even if the results
are highly satisfying with respect to residual normality and homoskedascity, data-induced
autocorrelation is often a problem because of the STCR_AD-series.
From the presented analysis I conclude: Since there is only a short time slight rise in
cyclical unemployment, STC certainly fulﬁlls a bridging function and saves employment.
To have a look at individual risks following STC there should be adequate microecnometric
data. Especially here, there is a lot to do since the only known study for Germany is
Büchel and Pannenberg (1992), which is certainly biased by reuniﬁcation and therefore5 STOPPAGE PARADOX 12
not reliable for a ’normal’ downswing.
After this analysis on aggregate macroeconomic data I turn now to a special pattern
I call ’stoppage paradox’. The next part will have a closer to this question.
5 Stoppage paradox
Some economists say that due to STC measures a healthy Schumpeterian creative destruc-
tion within recessions may be prevented, as the DIW (2010: 26, Eichhorst et al. 2009:
37, Brenke et al. 2010: 12) and Crimmann et al. (2010). Deeke (2009b: 11) however sees
no empirical relevance, nor does Völkel (1997: 129). Fritsche (2009: 779), Scholz (2009:
5), the IAB (2010: 42) and Bosch (2010: 32) think that this not a relevant question. For
policy makers this is quite an essential question: A harsh and short adjustment may be
more eﬃcient than a long but smooth period of slow and costly adjustment.
Using data on average stoppage - that is the average share of working time employees
in STC do not work - may help to answer the question whether structural change is
harmed. Average stoppage is a weighted mean and makes it possible to compute full time
equivalents - that is real employment saved by STC. If in 1991 1,760,000 workers got
STC and mean stoppage was about 54 %, STC saved about 960,000 full time employed
persons. If in 2009 1,140,000 people were on short time and the average stoppage was
about 32 %, STC held 370,000 employed in full time equivalents. In other words: If there
had not been STC, unemployment would have been about 10 % higher. However, this is
just a statistical view and there is no certainty as to how the unemployment rate would
have been without STC (see Deeke 2009a: 449 and Flechsenhar 1979: 369).
Figure 4: Stoppage (in %) and real GDP growth,
quarterly data
Source: German Council of Economic Experts, Bundesbank
If ﬁrms use STC, this gives economists the comfortable situation of getting data on the5 STOPPAGE PARADOX 13
personal capacity utilization of these ﬁrms in a crisis. Theoretically the average stoppage
published by the Federal Employment Agency should show a counter-cyclical behavior,
that is: in times of recession stoppage should rise since capacity utilization shrinks, and
in times of prosperity the other way round. However, a quick look to the data shows that
this expectation is not conﬁrmed. In Figure 4 we ﬁrst ﬁnd the expected reaction, e.g. in
1985 and 1986: while GDP decreases, stoppage rises. After reuniﬁcation however there is
a change in data: stoppage gets pro-cyclical. This seems to be a paradox.
From 1971 until 1988 (introduction of structural STC) the correlation coeﬃcient is
about -0.15 showing the expected sign. Between 1990 and 2010 this changes; correlation
is about 0.43; starting later in 1992 (until 2010) gives 0.57.
Before interpreting this paradox, two exemplary econometric estimations show that
we get a quite robust connection. In estimation (1) I will use average stoppage [AST]
and the industrial order-index published by the federal statistics oﬃce [ORDER]. Using
monthly data estimation, the period is from May 1998 until April 2011 (204 observations
after adjustment). In estimation (2) I check for cyclicality using the ifo business climate
index [IFO], from August 1998 until April 2011 (201 observations after adjustment).
The following both equations are estimated:
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 are the coeﬃcients, d1
S, d2
S,...d11
S dummies capturing seasonal development and z the
error term. In the data for December 2006 there are quite remarkable outliers. This is
certainly due to introduction of seasonal STC in 2006 and therefore dummies are included:
d_1206, d_1207, d_1208, d_1209, d_1210. They are equal to 1 in the indicated month
and otherwise 0. The estimation takes heteroscedascity-consistent coeﬃcient variance
(White). Essential results for interesting coeﬃcient a1 are shown in table 2.
As already suggested by the descriptive analysis there is a signiﬁcantly positive, pro
cyclical relationship between the two business cycle time series and average stoppage
contradicting theoretical expectations.
How to interpret this positive relationship? I suggest the following way to read the
data: In times of prosperity only small ﬁrms are concerned with STC. In summer, the
share of structural STC workers rises to 30 %, in winter cyclical STC is only 19 % of5 STOPPAGE PARADOX 14
Table 2: Estimation output (Order and ifo Business Climate), stoppage paradox




Adj. R2 0.88 0.89
N 204 201
Period May 1998 - April 2011 August 1998 - April 2011
Signiﬁcant at * 10 %- level, ** 5 %- level, *** 1 %-level
Figure 5: Stoppage discriminated between cyclical STC, seasonal STC and transfer STC
Source: Federal Employment Agency
all STC receivers (calculations of 2007 data). In the best case, ﬁrms are restructuring -
in the worst case a free riding management is just lowering costs in the short run before
ﬁring workers. In particular, using STC for structural reasons may lead to high stoppage.
In times of recession there are a lot of ﬁrms using STC because of the downturn. Their
share rises to 98 % of all ﬁrms in 2009. The only consistent story is now that these ﬁrms
do have unused capacities, but at the same time they are competitive enough not to starve
and not to be at the fringe of the market close to bankruptcy. Since the majority of ﬁrms
use STC only in downturns and their share is especially high, average stoppage decreases.
Reaching times of upswing again, these ﬁrms are leaving the STC program and therefore
the share of other enterprises with high stoppage for structural reasons rises again. In
other words: The pro-cyclicality is therefore a statistical eﬀect.
A closer look at non-published data conﬁrms (Figure 5) this story.9 There is a low
9Thanks to the data-service of the Federal Employment Agency for sending these data. In January
2009 there is a sudden decrease in stoppage for structural reasons. This may be due to data revision,
eﬀecting in a lower and more seasonally sensitive series. However, the stoppage series for cyclical reasons6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 15
stock of structural STC-ﬁrms (lef box, lowest black line) with high - time independent
high - stoppage (right box, highest black line). In the actual crisis there are many ﬁrms
entering STC (left box, highest grey line) with relatively low stoppage (right box, lowest
grey line) and therefore making the weighted average decrease. Not only the total average
stoppage decreases; it seems that - beside data revision - the average stoppage in cyclical
STC decreased since the beginning of the crisis, too.
This analysis leads to a quite interesting conclusion: Most of the ﬁrms using cyclical
STC are not in danger of being uncompetitive any more. They use cyclical STC to
cushion the economic downturn. Therefore arguments in a Hayekian tradition, as were
mentioned by DIW (2010: 26), Eichhorst et al. (2009: 37) and Brenke et al. (2010:
12) may theoretically be reasonable. Data tell another story in that for most ﬁrms using
STC there is no real danger of hindering Schumpeterian structural change in downturns.
However, this is still no argument against free-riding at the expense of the public budget.
6 Concluding remarks
In the actual crisis, short time compensation [STC] saw a remarkable revival. In Section
2, this paper showed the actual institutional framework and its development. A ﬁrst
descriptive analysis showed that STC was quite often used within former macroeconomic
shocks. However there is a lack of scientiﬁc analysis. Section 3 included STC in a small
model showing that temporary wage subsidies may help to dampen cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Using a VAR model, I argued in Section 4 that there is evidence for a bridging-function
of STC and a stabilization of private consumption. Discussing the pro-cyclical average
stoppage it could be seen in Section 5 that STC does not hinder Schumpeterian structural
change, but that most ﬁrms just use the bridging function.
The German labour market passed the crisis quite well. How STC is used in the future
is not at all clear. In normal economic downturns the most-used internal ﬂexibility tool
will be working time accounts. However STC will play a role for unexpected and hard
economic downturns, particularly if policymakers lower the entry barriers in recessions
(see also the advices by the OECD 2010).
Hopefully, following the recession, the gap in scientiﬁc analysis of STC will be ﬁlled
on the macroeconomic and microeconometric levels.
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